The lesson of history, then, is that even as institutions and policy makers improve, there will always be a temptation to stretch the limits. Just as an individual can go bankrupt no matter how rich she starts out, a financial system can collapse under the pressure of greed, politics, and profits no matter how well regulated it seems to be― Carmen M. Reinhart
In this issue
Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll! PSE’s Q2 Retail Activities Validates Ongoing Consumer Weakness
I. Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll!
II. Slowing Retail GDP Validated by Topline Performance of PSE’s Retail Chains
III. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s) Designed to Rescue the Banking System; Banks Bolstered the PSEi 30’s Stagnant Q2 Net Income
IV. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s): Reduce Debt Servicing Costs to Accommodate MORE Debt!
V. BSP Rate Cut Validates the Price Signals of the Philippine Treasury Market
VI. Summary and Conclusion: Watch for the Third and Fourth Phase of the Marcos-Stimulus (Pandemic Rescue Template 2.0)
Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll! PSE’s Q2 Retail Activities Validates Ongoing Consumer Weakness
The BSP opened its series of monetary easing with a rate cut last week validating our thesis that the unannounced "Marcos-nomics stimulus" is on a roll!
I. Bullseye! BSP Opens with First Rate Cut, the "Marcos-nomics Stimulus " is on a Roll!
Bullseye!
In its second phase of the unannounced Marcos-nomics stimulus, the BSP (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) began its campaign to formally ease financial conditions with its first rate cut.
The fact that the "Marcos-nomics stimulus" is on a roll means that widening fiscal deficits, which should also reverberate into "trade deficits" and expand the "twin deficits," should escalate public debt levels and, correspondingly, increase the debt burden.
With fiscal deficits likely to bulge ahead, prompting more borrowings, the logical sequence would be for the BSP to cut rates to ease the onus of debt servicing.
And that’s only the argument for Philippine government debt.
The BSP’s case for rate cuts will also involve private sector’s mounting debt burden or systemic debt in general. And that excludes shadow banking or informal finance.
Therefore, BSP rate cuts represent the next phase of the "Marcos-nomics stimulus." (Prudent Investor, July 2024; bold original)
GMA News, August, 15, 2024: The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Thursday decided to reduce policy rates by 25 basis points, the first cut in nearly four years and the first adjustment since the off-cycle hike in October 2023.
Why would the BSP start a series of rate cuts with a Q2 headline GDP of 6.3% (6% for the 1H GDP)?
Yet, the BSP continues to confuse the public by hedging its position with a "rinse and repeat" stance: We will cut, we will not cut, we will cut, we will not cut... to thy kingdom come.
Just a day before, a business media outlet even cited the BSP as having ""more room to stay tight" after better-than-expected gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the second quarter."
Stay tight, then cut rates? Incredible.
For a supposedly data-driven institution, why fixate on interest rates while ignoring the financial and monetary developments despite their actions?
Figure 1
For instance, the BSP’s report on total financial resources (TFR) rocketed by 10.54% to a record Php 32.332 trillion last June, with the banking system, led by the Universal and Commercial banks, surging by 12.3%. (Figure 1, upper window)
Aggregate TFR and bank FR amounted to 128% and 107% of GDP, respectively.
That is to say, not only have growth rates been accelerating, but banks have also been deepening their stranglehold over the nation’s financial resources—which alternatively translates to an escalation of concentration risk. (Figure 1, middle graph)
Needless to ask, why would TFR and bank assets skyrocket if rates have been "tight?" Or, why the crescendo of systemic leverage?
Amazing.
II. Slowing Retail GDP Validated by Topline Performance of PSE’s Retail Chains
Getting back to the essence of the Marcos-nomics, despite the Orwellian language, why the cut rates?
To gauge the heartbeat of consumers, we use the PSE’s Quarterly Report (17Q) to analyze the quarterly activities of the major non-construction retail chains listed on the stock exchange (SM Retail, Puregold, Robinsons Retail, Philippine Seven, SSI Group, and Metro Retail Group).
The growth rate of BIG 6 retail chains bounced marginally from the Q1 low of 5.13% to 7.22% in Q2. However, since peaking in Q3 2022, its growth rate has been slowing—exhibited by the downtrend. (Figure 1, lowest image)
On the other hand, since hitting a low of 10.6% in Q3 2023, the nominal retail GDP has improved in the last three quarters—with Q2 posting a 12.8% growth. The revenues of the BIG 6 accounted for an estimated 24.6% share of the Philippine retail market, based on the retail GDP.
The huge variance in growth rates between the revenues of the BIG 6 tell us that either the NON-listed retail chains OUTPERFORMED, or that the retail GDP has been exaggerated.
The thing is, the growth rate may differ, but the trends resonated.
Real consumer GDP also corroborated the slowdown.
In the first two quarters of 2024, real consumer spending grew by 4.6%.
The slowdown in consumer spending is just one aspect of the complex chain of people’s actions.
Figure 2
While consumer spending has slowed, loans of the BIG 5 retail chains (excluding SM Retail) hit an all-time high in Q2. (Figure 2, topmost graph)
As banks continue to shift their portfolios toward consumers—with the gap in favor of consumer lending reaching its highest-level last June—credit card and salary loan non-performing loans (NPLs) have accelerated in Q1 2024. (Figure 2, middle and lowest charts)
Figure 3
This represents a breathtaking structural transformation anchored on Keynesian ideology that the consumer drives the economy. (Figure 3, topmost graph)
Unfortunately, despite the unprecedented metamorphosis, increased leveraging has only resulted in the material slackening of consumer spending.
Essentially, the consensus comprised of media, experts and officials has overlooked the importance of balance sheet conditions and productivity!
III. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s) Designed to Rescue the Banking System; Banks Bolstered the PSEi 30’s Stagnant Q2 Net Income
But there’s more.
The BSP wasn’t transparent enough to reveal that despite the seismic transformation of its business model and the all-time highs in credit expansion within the Philippine banking system, the industry has experienced an erosion of profit growth since Q2 2022—coinciding with rising rates. (Figure 3, middle diagram)
From a low of 2.95% in Q1, bank profits increased by 4.1% in Q2 2024. The data exhibit the sustained corrosion of bank liquidity despite the three-year streak in profit growth. Bank’s cash-to-deposit and liquid asset-to-deposits on an 11-year downtrend. (Figure 3, lowest chart)
In my humble opinion, these bank profits represent accounting profits because they conceal massive losses through Held-to-Maturity (HTM) holdings, opaqueness in capital conditions, and unpublished NPLs due to subsidies and various relief measures.
Figure 4
In any case, the big three PSEi banks saved the PSEi 30's Q2 net income activities from outright stagnation.
Net income by the non-financial members of the PSEi slightly contracted by 0.13%. However, the 13.71% net income growth of the PSEi 30 banks boosted the aggregate net income growth to 2.35%. (Figure 4, upper table)
Meanwhile, despite disinflationary forces, revenue growth increased by 9.14% in Q2, pushing the first semester’s topline up by 8.71% (to be discussed in another post).
In brief, it’s not just consumers; the overall slowing of the economy has been evident in the topline and bottom-line performance of the PSEi 30. We will omit the debt conditions of the PSEi 30’s non-financials from this discussion.
As a side note, why then the PSEi 30 pump?
Think of it this way: why the slowdown in the PSE’s performance despite record bank lending and the soaring expansion of systemic leverage (exhibited by members of the PSEi 30)?
Consumer spending per capita GDP peaked in Q1 2021 and has turned south in the face of historic levels of systemic leverage—comprising the formal credit (bank credit plus public debt) system, which accounted for 112% of the annualized 2024 GDP! (Figure 4, lower graph)
Figure 5
As it stands, this monumental build-up in systemic leverage translates to escalating hidden financial skeletons in the form of balance sheet mismatches—which have yet to be revealed. UC bank and public debt accounted for 108% of the annualized 2024 GDP. (Figure 5, topmost chart)
Incredible.
In a nutshell, the Marcos-nomics stimulus via the BSP’s rate cut also represents the RESCUE of the banking system (Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0).
IV. Marcos-nomics Rate Cut(s): Reduce Debt Servicing Costs to Accommodate MORE Debt!
With the slowing of the real economy, the government has stepped up the tempo of its spending to boost the statistical economy, GDP.
This represents the opening salvo of Marcos-nomics. Besides, the torrent of spending is all about politics: pre-election funding, the subtle pivot to a war economy, the deepening administrative (infrastructure and bureaucracy) and the welfare state.
Record Q2 spending bolstered the Q2 budget deficit and accounted for a direct 27.4% share of the Q2 GDP, the second largest in GDP’s history (as previously explained). (Figure 5, middle chart)
Since debt has financed the Marcos-nomics stimulus, the rising but flawed debt-to-GDP metrics should increase further. With it, the debt servicing-to-GDP ratio should also rise.
If anything, both debt-to-GDP and debt-servicing-to-GDP ratios have now exceeded pre-Asian crisis levels. (Figure 5, lowest image)
This signifies the primary reason why the BSP cut rates.
Its recourse to deficit spending means more debt, so the BSP must reduce its cost of servicing to allow for or accommodate more debt!
Anyway, according to the government officials, there is "Nothing to worry about PH debt." Debt won’t matter until it does. Alternatively, this could also mean "never believe anything in politics until it has been officially denied."
Furthermore, as with the pandemic template, liquidity injections should represent the third phase of the Marcos-nomics stimulus.
Figure 6
The BSP's net claims on the Central Government (NCoCG) remain adrift at near record levels— indicating near-record holdings of government debt by the BSP. What tightening? Where? (Figure 6, topmost chart)
The all-time highs in public spending and bank lending should translate into HIGHER liquidity growth. The growth of BSP’s currency issuance has been accelerating since April 2024, rising by 7.4%—its highest since December 2022!
Should public spending, bank lending, and bank (NCoCG) fail to deliver the various government headline targets, expect the BSP's NCoCG to explode higher.
The fourth and final phase of the Marcos stimulus would involve expanding subsidies and widening the coverage of various relief measures for the banking system.
Again, this would mirror the Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0.
All these said, the rebound in liquidity growth should manifest in higher inflation and reinforce the uptrend of the USD-Philippine peso exchange rate. (Figure 6, middle and lowest graphs)
Moreover, the Fed has long been used by the BSP as a pretext for keeping its stance, unfortunately, waiting for the FED seemed like "Waiting for Godot," so the BSP relented and eased ahead of the Fed. This should provide further fuel to the bull market of the USDPHP over time.
V. BSP Rate Cut Validates the Price Signals of the Philippine Treasury Market
Lastly, the BSP rate cuts validated the Philippine treasury markets.
The curve’s transition from a steepening to a bullish flattening to an inversion in the belly (2-7 years yield) highlights disinflation, rising uncertainties and the growing slack in the real economy (rising risk of recession).
Figure 7
The belly’s inversion only deepened right after the BSP’s rate cut (as of August 16th)
And don’t just take it from me, a chart from the BSP’s 2023 Financial Stability Report expresses this. (p.13)
VI. Summary and Conclusion: Watch for the Third and Fourth Phase of the Marcos-Stimulus (Pandemic Rescue Template 2.0)
So, there you have it.
Last week’s BSP rate cut validated our thesis of a "Marcos-nomics stimulus."
It represents the second phase of the tacit bailout of the deficit-spending-driven GDP, the banking system, and the firms of elites. The other objectives are the financing of the growing domain of various political agendas—mostly pre-election spending, the warfare state, infrastructure, and the bureaucratic state.
One can expect the liquidity injections via the BSP and the banking system to account for the third phase of the stimulus program.
To complete the fourth and final phase of the Pandemic Bailout Template 2.0, various subsidies and relief measures will be implemented to support the banking system.
Despite the interim disinflation phase, the sustained bailout means the re-emergence of the third wave of inflation and the strengthening of the USD-Philippine peso bull market.
The real tightening is about to come.
Good luck to those who believe in the illusion that manipulated stock market pumps will translate into economic prosperity.
___
References:
Prudent Investor, Bullseye! “Marcos-Nomics” Stimulus on a Roll as Q2 2024 Public Spending Hits All-Time High! BSP Rate Cuts Next? July 28,2024
Other post on Marcos-nomics:
Prudent Investor, Philippines' Q2 GDP Growth of 6.3%: Unpacking the "Marcos-nomics" Stimulus, June 2024 Philippine Employment Rates—A Statistical Pump August 11, 2024
Prudent Investor, Marcos-nomics stimulus: Yields of the Philippine Treasury Curve Plunged, The Turbocharging of Pre-Election Liquidity Growth July 14, 2024
Prudent Investor, Could the Philippine Government Implement a 'Marcosnomics' Stimulus Blending BSP Rate Cuts and Accelerated Deficit Spending? June 30, 2024
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