Because credits springing from fiat inflation provide an easy financial edge, they have the tendency to encourage reckless behavior by the chief executives. This is especially the case with managers of large corporations who have easy access to the capital markets. Their recklessness is often confused with innovativeness—Jörg Guido Hülsmann
In this issue:
Stagflation Part 15: The PSEi 30 1H 2026 Earnings Mirage — Nominal Growth, Record Debt, Real Stagnation
I. PSEi 30 1H: Record Revenue, Record Debt — And a 2.6% Economy
II. The PSEi 30 divergence
III. Debt: Concentration Makes The Story Worse
IV. Revenue: Where Did The Growth Come From? Meralco’s Money Illusion
V. Price Controls Don't Make The Real Adjustment Disappear
VI. Jollibee: Margin versus Volume Tradeoff
VII. SM Retail's money illusion
VIII. SMC: When Debt Becomes the Growth Mechanism
IX. Q2: Iran War’s Oil Shock Sharpens The Divergence; Three Balance Sheets, One Problem
X. The Corporate Face of Stagflation
XI. Conclusion: The PSEi 30 Earnings Mirage
Stagflation Part 15: The PSEi 30 1H 2026 Earnings Mirage — Nominal Growth, Record Debt, Real Stagnation
Record corporate revenue and debt expanded far faster than real GDP growth as policy-suppressed adjustment migrated into prices, margins, investment, and balance sheets.
I. PSEi 30 1H: Record Revenue, Record Debt — And a 2.6% Economy
The PSEi 30's 1H 2026 results look remarkably strong — until we ask a more basic question: strong in what sense?
The figures below are reported corporate results. Even taking the reported numbers at face value, nominal growth in pesos is not, by itself, evidence of real economic growth in output. That is the relevant sense of “money illusion” here: mistaking a change in the unit of account for a change in the underlying quantity—or even quality. Once we make that distinction, the numbers are neither paradoxical nor contradictory. They are consistent with debt-financed nominal expansion occurring alongside weak real growth.
Revenue surged. Assets surged. Cash surged. Debt exploded! But aggregate earnings fell. And all of this happened while Philippine real GDP grew just 2.6% in 1H and 2.3% in Q2.
That is not a separate corporate story from the weak GDP, expanding fiscal deficit, and rising public debt already examined in Parts 13 and 14. It is the same story appearing on corporate balance sheets.
The backdrop is familiar: EO 110's price-suppression scheme, the BSP's five regulatory relief measures, its warnings against NDF speculation, and the defense of the Php 61.75 ‘soft peg’ peso ceiling — all operating while inflation surged and the fiscal and trade deficits widened. Policy can suppress, redistribute, or postpone an adjustment. It cannot repeal the underlying real-resource constraint.
The PSEi 30 shows where that adjustment appeared on corporate balance sheets.
II. The PSEi 30 divergence
1H 2026, aggregate
Figure 1
Against that: 1H real GDP grew 2.6%, while Q2 real GDP grew just 2.3%.
Revenue rose more than five times as fast as real GDP. Debt rose more than four times as fast. Net income fell. (Figure 1)
The corporate sector, therefore, is not experiencing “strong growth” in the real-economy sense. It is experiencing rapid nominal and financial expansion alongside weak real growth.
And the aggregate numbers conceal an important feature of that expansion: concentration.
A handful of large conglomerates account for a disproportionate share of the increase in debt, as well as a substantial share of the revenue, assets, and cash behind the index. The result is that the PSEi 30 aggregate is increasingly shaped by the balance sheets of a few very large firms.
III. Debt: Concentration Makes The Story Worse
Figure 2
PSEi 30 nonfinancial debt rose by a record Php 654.171B. (Figure 2, upper table and lower chart)
Twenty of the 26 nonfinancial members added debt. But SMC alone contributed Php 294.1B — roughly 45% of the entire increase — taking its own debt to an unprecedented Php 1.798 trillion, up 19.55% and equivalent to 28.8% of all PSEi 30 outstanding nonfinancial debt.
The concentration extends beyond SMC. SMC, AEV, and Meralco — the parties to the SMC-AEV-MER gas/power asset transaction, part of the implicit utility bailouts examined last year — together accounted for Php 363.62B, or 56% of the entire increase in PSEi 30 nonfinancial debt.
Yet, the three largest borrowers overall were SMC, AC, and ICTSI.
This matters because concentration changes what the aggregate means.
When the same large balance sheets dominate debt, revenue, assets, and cash simultaneously, the index is no longer a useful proxy for a broad cross-section of independent businesses. A handful of conglomerates increasingly determine the financial appearance of the whole.
The scale is also significant. The Php 6.251 trillion of PSEi 30 nonfinancial debt is roughly 16.3% of the BSP's total financial-system resources.
This is not merely a story about leverage inside individual companies. It is a story about the growing weight of a concentrated group of corporate borrowers within the financial system itself.
SMC is the extreme case. Its Php 1.798 trillion of debt is larger than its entire 2025 revenue and more than eleven times its roughly Php 160 billion equity market capitalization. That is not presented as a conventional measure of debt capacity. It illustrates the mismatch between the financial claims accumulated by the conglomerate and the equity value the market assigns to those claims.
Acquisitions, asset transfers, refinancing, and debt recycling have expanded SMC's financial structure well beyond the earnings capacity of several of its underlying segments.
That is where Minsky's framework becomes useful — not as a label, but as a description of the financing process.
The issue is not simply that SMC carries a large amount of debt. It is that an increasingly large financial structure depends on continued refinancing, asset transactions, and the ability to roll existing obligations forward while earnings growth remains uneven. When operating cash flow is insufficient to service the debt without continued refinancing or the realization of assets, the financing structure evolves to what Minsky called PONZI FINANCE: obligations can no longer be serviced from the cash flows generated by the underlying assets and require new borrowing, asset sales, or other financial transactions to remain current.
A highly leveraged balance sheet is not automatically a Minsky problem. The problem emerges when the financing structure becomes dependent on the continuation of the financial process that created it.
The BSP-FSCC's warning about a “wall of maturities” therefore looks different when viewed against this concentration.
Refinancing risk is not distributed evenly across thirty unrelated companies. A large portion is attached to a relatively small number of very large balance sheets. SMC alone represents an unusually large share of the debt expansion behind the index.
This also creates a systemic asymmetry.
When debt becomes concentrated in conglomerates that are economically and politically difficult to allow to fail, leverage can create a form of too-big-to-fail risk even before an actual crisis occurs. The concern is not simply the size of any one company's liabilities. It is the interaction between corporate size, political importance, creditor exposure, and the concentration of those exposures within the banking and financial system.
The BSP can describe the financial system as “resilient” at the aggregate level while significant fragility accumulates underneath that aggregate. A banking system can remain adequately capitalized while becoming increasingly exposed to the same large counterparties.
Concentrated corporate leverage therefore exposes concentrated counterparty risk: the failure or forced deleveraging of one major conglomerate can transmit losses through several lenders and financial institutions at once.
The same concentration also creates a crowding-out problem.
The issue is not merely that government borrows more. Large corporations and government are drawing on the same underlying pool of financial resources. When conglomerates undertake increasingly large amounts of debt financing without a corresponding increase in productive real investment, they compete with government and other borrowers for savings and bank balance-sheet capacity—coming at the expense of MSMEs.
That matters because the additional borrowing is not necessarily expanding the economy's productive capacity proportionately. If credit is increasingly being used for acquisitions, refinancing, asset transfers, and balance-sheet restructuring rather than for new productive capacity, the financial claim on future income can grow much faster than the real income available to service it.
The result is a reinforcing process:
weak real growth → nominal expansion → heavier corporate borrowing → concentrated leverage → greater refinancing dependence → greater financial fragility.
The PSEi 30's headline growth therefore becomes less informative the deeper we look into its composition. Revenue is expanding, assets are expanding, cash is expanding, and debt is expanding — but earnings are not keeping pace, real GDP is weak, and an increasing share of the financial expansion is concentrated in a handful of very large borrowers.
The divergence is not a statistical curiosity.
It is the balance-sheet expression of the adjustment.
IV. Revenue: Where Did The Growth Come From? Meralco’s Money Illusion
Figure 3
PSEi 30 revenue surged 13.51% — banks +10.95%, nonfinancials +13.8%. SMC, AEV, and Meralco were the biggest peso revenue gainers. At first glance, this looks like broad corporate resilience. But revenue is a peso measure: it tells us the value of transactions, not the quantity of goods and services behind them. (Figure 3, upper window)
Meralco makes the distinction almost perfectly.
Meralco: stagflation in miniature. Physical electricity sales barely moved — Q2 GWh rose just 0.66%, while 1H GWh fell 0.46% — essentially flat to contracting, tracking the broader slowdown. Yet peso electricity sales over the same periods rose 26.4% in Q2 and 17% for the half. (Figure 3, lower graph)
This is the money illusion in the revenue numbers: the peso value of sales rose dramatically while the underlying physical quantity barely changed. The apparent expansion is therefore much larger in nominal terms than in real activity.
Income followed the peso line, not the volume line: up 21.14% in Q2 and 12.7% for the half, on revenue growth of 24.65% and 15.7%, respectively.
The wedge is FIT-All, GEA-All, and other generation/transmission pass-through charges — regulatory and redistributive add-ons, not demand. Consumers pay more through the bill; that additional revenue is redistributed through the system to generators, transmission, and designated energy programs, producing a much higher peso value without a comparable rise in physical consumption. That is the money illusion in concrete form: the peso value of electricity sales rises sharply while the underlying physical quantity barely moves.
And the "resilient earnings" narrative carries its own balance-sheet cost. Meralco's debt rose 6.5% to a record Php 247.36 billion over the same window. Under the current structure, that increase is not simply additional corporate borrowing in the abstract. It forms part of the balance-sheet transfer associated with the SMC-AEV-MER transaction — the same process examined earlier in the context of the implicit utility bailouts. What appears in the aggregate as stronger revenue and earnings is therefore occurring alongside a redistribution of financial claims and liabilities across the corporate balance sheets.
Meralco consequently captures both sides of the process in miniature: the nominal value of economic activity rises far faster than its physical volume, while the accompanying balance-sheet transfers create additional financial claims without a comparable expansion of real productive capacity. SMC shows the same process at far greater scale.
V. Price Controls Don't Make The Real Adjustment Disappear
Recent BusinessWorld/Bloomberg reporting on companies adapting to tight consumer budgets adds a useful, independent dimension here — corporate behavior confirming the balance-sheet read rather than just corroborating it after the fact. Shakey's Pizza Asia posted a one-third drop in first-half profit and is slowing expansion, citing inflation and fuel costs weakening non-essential spending. Jollibee itself, despite improved customer visits, cut its same-store-sales forecast, profit-growth outlook, and store-opening plans. Monde Nissin is switching to lower-cost ingredients and staggering price increases of 1-5% by product rather than raising prices outright. Century Pacific Food, after holding prices flat for two years, is now raising them 4-5% while planning smaller increases ahead.
These are companies signaling, through their own operating decisions, that they read the demand environment as weaker than their revenue lines suggest — the same conclusion reached here from the balance sheets, arrived at independently from the boardroom.
That reporting also points to a broader menu of adjustment worth naming explicitly. When firms can't or won't fully pass higher costs through the sticker price, the adjustment migrates elsewhere:
- price inflation (raise the price),
- shrinkflation (keep the price, shrink the quantity),
- skimpflation (keep the price, cut the quality — Monde Nissin's ingredient substitution is a live example),
- sneakflation (keep the headline price but raise the effective price through less-visible fees or charges — for example, utility FIT-All and GEA-All charges, or added service, delivery, and platform fees)
- margin compression (absorb the cost),
- cost-cutting (trim inputs, labor, expansion — Shakey's slowing its rollout), or
- balance-sheet expansion (borrow, refinance, or transfer assets to keep the structure moving — SMC and Meralco).
The price can be capped; the loaf can't. It gets smaller, or the ingredients get cheaper, or the margin gets squeezed, or the investment gets postponed, or the debt fills the gap.
Price suppression can suppress the price adjustment. It cannot suppress the underlying real-resource constraint — the adjustment simply moves to a different line item.
VI. Jollibee: Margin versus Volume Tradeoff
Jollibee Food Corporation’s Q2 net income rose 3% to Php 3.519 billion, but 1H net income was still down 16.7% to Php 4.928 billion.
Figure 4
Domestic sales rose 5.61% in Q2 and 6.8% in 1H, despite a 2.7% increase in store count. Against Q2 inflation of 6.8%, real domestic sales were essentially stagnant to negative. More stores generated only roughly inflation-level growth in peso sales. (Figure 4, topmost pane)
JFC defended profitability where physical volume could not deliver it: margin over volume. That is a rational corporate response to constrained real demand, but it is not evidence of a booming consumer economy. With GDP growing only 2.3% in Q2, the more direct reading is that JFC was protecting margins in an environment where real domestic demand was weak. (Figure 4, middle diagram)
JFC's balance sheet adds another dimension. Debt rose 13.6% to Php 93.2 billion over the same period. That increase should be read in the context of JFC's entire multinational financial structure — its international expansion and operations, acquisitions, and broader funding requirements — rather than reduced to a purely domestic story. But that broader scope does not make the debt irrelevant to the analysis. It shows that the company's nominal sales and earnings resilience is occurring within a substantially expanding balance sheet.
Jollibee therefore provides another expression of the same process: nominal sales can rise while real domestic volume remains weak; the corporation responds by protecting margins and adjusting operations; and the resulting performance sits within an expanding financial structure that extends beyond the domestic market. The peso-denominated numbers can therefore look resilient without representing comparable growth in the underlying quantity of goods and services.
VII. SM Retail's money illusion
SM Retail grew 5.42% in 1H 2026. At the parent-company level, SM Investments' revenue rose 7.53% and net income 6.38%, but those are consolidated figures covering businesses beyond retail. The relevant consumer-sector measure here is SM Retail's own 5.42% growth.(Figure 4, lowest image)
That number looks less impressive against the inflation environment. Q2 CPI was 6.8% while core CPI 4.1%, meaning SM Retail's nominal growth was below the rate at which consumer prices were rising or slightly above the ex-food and ex-energy CPI.
In purchasing-power terms, a 5.42% increase in retail activity does not represent real growth if prices were rising faster.
There is another reason the number deserves scrutiny: SM's retail footprint was expanding at the same time. SM Prime opened two new Philippine malls in 2025 — SM City Laoag and SM City La Union — and opened SM City Zamboanga in March 2026, its 90th Philippine mall. Thus, the 5.42% growth in SM Retail occurred while the broader SM retail platform was adding physical capacity.
That makes the result a useful indicator of the consumer-side stagflation problem. The business was not merely operating the same stores and selling at higher prices; the broader retail network was expanding as well. Yet SM Retail's nominal growth still lagged Q2 inflation.
The distinction is the money illusion: more pesos can be recorded as sales without a comparable increase in the quantity of goods purchased. Some of the nominal increase can come from higher prices, while some can come from additional stores and retail capacity. What remains is the underlying real expansion in consumer demand.
On the available figures, that real expansion appears weak. SM Retail was adding to its physical footprint, yet its nominal growth was still below the prevailing rate of consumer-price inflation. The headline 5.42% therefore overstates the strength of the underlying consumer economy when read without the price effect.
SM Retail is consequently another expression of the same stagflationary process: the nominal economy grows, but purchasing power and real consumer demand do not keep pace.
VIII. SMC: When Debt Becomes the Growth Mechanism
SMC's nonfinancial debt increased by Php 294.1 billion in 1H 2026, reaching Php 1.798 trillion (!). Cash, assets, and revenue all surged. Income did not follow. Of SMC's eight segments, only three posted positive 1H income growth — infrastructure +29%, GSMI +3%, and food +8% — while the rest declined.
Petron and Global Power delivered substantial revenue growth, but earnings moved in the opposite direction: Petron's fell 27% and Global Power's 7%. Revenue can therefore rise sharply without a corresponding increase in underlying profitability.
Petron's case is particularly instructive because its revenue growth occurred amid an extraordinary oil-supply shock rather than normal operating conditions. The Iran conflict disrupted traditional Middle Eastern supply routes, prompting Petron to secure alternative sources. It purchased 2.48 million barrels of Russian crude as an emergency measure, with the government encouraging oil companies to find alternative supplies. This was not simply a normal sourcing decision or evidence of a structural improvement in Petron's operating economics; it was part of an exceptional policy and supply response to the disruption in support of EO-110.
Media accounts that attribute SMC's earnings decline primarily to foreign-exchange losses and one-off gains associated with the SMC-AEV-MER transaction explain why reported income moved during the period. They do not explain the larger divergence: why did SMC add Php 294.1 billion of debt while earnings capacity across the conglomerate remained generally weak?
Figure 5
Nor is the Php 294.1 billion increase a one-off event. SMC's debt has been rising since at least 2013. The largest quarter-on-quarter increase occurred during the first oil shock in 2022, while the Php 129.57 billion increase in Q2 2026 was the second-largest quarterly increase since Q3 2022. The current surge is therefore another stage in an established process of balance-sheet expansion. (Figure 5, upper visual)
The character of the borrowing matters. The cash-flow pattern shows that SMC is increasingly borrowing to refinance existing obligations, adding to the debt stock while earnings remain weak. This is the mechanism that brings Minsky's Ponzi-finance concept into view: when operating earnings are insufficient to reduce the debt burden, the financial structure becomes dependent on continued refinancing to sustain itself. Debt is no longer merely financing expansion; increasingly, further borrowing is required to maintain the existing financial structure—even as the cost of borrowing rises. (Figure 5, lower chart)
This also gives the BSP's regulatory-relief measures and its warning about a “wall of maturities” a more concrete significance. The measures can be understood as institutional accommodation of a refinancing problem that has become increasingly important for large, highly leveraged borrowers such as SMC. They provide additional room for maturities to be rolled forward and the adjustment to be deferred; they do not eliminate the underlying liabilities.
That is the deeper Minskyan concern. Refinancing postpones the adjustment, but does not remove it. When refinancing itself adds to the debt stock, the continuation of the financial structure increasingly depends on the availability of still more financing—and only an easy money environment accommodates this.
SMC's 1H 2026 results therefore reveal a widening gap between financial (balance sheet) expansion and earnings capacity. Debt, assets, cash, and nominal revenue expanded rapidly while earnings remained generally weak. The balance sheet is no longer simply recording the growth process. Increasingly, it has become part of the mechanism sustaining it.
IX. Q2: Iran War’s Oil Shock Sharpens The Divergence; Three Balance Sheets, One Problem
Figure 6
Aggregate Q2 net income grew just 1.79% — banks −0.02%, nonbanks +2.27%, with 19 constituents up and 11 down. Revenue, by contrast, surged 18.34% — nonbanks +19.13%, banks +11.99%. (Figure 6, upper table)
The Philippine banking system itself grew 7.62% in Q2—propped up by BSP relief measures despite pandemic era financial losses. (Figure 6, lower graph)
Revenue +18.34% against income +1.79% is the sharpest single number in this piece: nominal activity expanded dramatically while the bottom line barely moved. The divergence is difficult to reconcile with the language of broad-based corporate strength. It is more consistent with an economy in which nominal values and financial claims are expanding faster than the earnings and real activity needed to support them.
This is where the PSEi 30 closes the loop with the rest of the series. The government expanded its balance sheet to sustain fiscal spending, with public debt growing faster than nominal and real GDP. Banks expanded credit. Corporations expanded debt. Households absorbed record peso consumer loans. Real GDP grew only 2.3% in Q2.
These are not separate phenomena. They are interconnected balance sheets. Government borrowing creates claims against future fiscal resources. Bank lending creates claims against future household and corporate income. Corporate borrowing creates claims against future corporate cash flows. The financial system can transfer purchasing power across time, finance acquisitions, refinance existing obligations, sustain operating structures, and facilitate asset transfers. But these transactions do not remove the underlying resource constraint; they redistribute claims against it.
The more important question, therefore, is what happens when institutions repeatedly prevent those claims from being reconciled through structural adjustment?
That is the significance of the policy sequence examined throughout this series.
- EO 110 suppresses or redistributes price adjustment.
- BSP regulatory relief accommodates stressed balance sheets.
- The exchange-rate regime resists adjustment in the currency.
Each intervention can relieve pressure in the short run, but the underlying imbalance does not disappear simply because its immediate expression has been suppressed.
The adjustment is displaced — into quantities, quality, margins, investment, debt, refinancing, or other balance-sheet transfers.
This is the institutional-control problem identified in Luc Lelievre's analysis of why apparently stable systems can become increasingly fragile: interventions that preserve stability at one point in the system can prevent the signals and adjustments through which underlying errors are corrected.
The consequence is cumulative. When structural adjustment is repeatedly postponed, debt finance increasingly becomes the mechanism through which imbalances are carried forward. Balance sheets expand to absorb pressures that prices, markets, and institutions have been prevented from fully clearing. That can sustain nominal activity for a time, but it also permits malinvestment, misallocation, and financial claims to accumulate against an underlying real economy that is growing much more slowly.
That is what the H1 2026 data reveal: not simply financial claims growing faster than output, but a system in which policy accommodation is allowing the divergence to persist and increasingly shifting the adjustment onto balance sheets.
X. The Corporate Face of Stagflation
The four companies examined above show four different margins of adjustment:
- Meralco — physical output barely moves while peso revenue surges: price and redistribution.
- Jollibee — sales barely keep pace with inflation while margins recover: margin over volume.
- SM Retail — nominal sales growth remains below inflation despite an expanding retail footprint: money illusion and weak real demand.
- SMC — debt, assets, cash, and revenue expand while earnings remain generally weak: balance-sheet expansion and refinancing.
And beneath all four sits an adjustment that does not necessarily appear in headline financial statements: shrinkflation, skimpflation, sneakflation, margin compression, deferred investment, lower-quality substitution, and debt accumulation. The loaf gets smaller; the ingredient gets cheaper; the product becomes thinner; the expansion is postponed; the fee appears somewhere else; or the balance sheet absorbs the pressure.
The price can be suppressed. The adjustment cannot.
That is why the corporate response to stagflation cannot be read from CPI alone. The adjustment can move through price, quantity, quality, margins, investment, or debt, and different companies are choosing different combinations of the same underlying menu.
What looks like stability in one line of the accounts can therefore represent adjustment somewhere else. And when policy repeatedly suppresses the visible adjustment, the hidden adjustment increasingly migrates into balance sheets — where it appears first as accommodation, then as leverage, and eventually as fragility.
XI. Conclusion: The PSEi 30 Earnings Mirage
Strong in what sense?
The PSEi 30's 1H 2026 results look robust: revenue reached Php 3.974 trillion, assets Php 33.417 trillion and cash Php 1.608 trillion, but nonfinancial debt Php 6.251 trillion.
Yet revenue grew 13.51% while real GDP grew only 2.6% in 1H and 2.3% in Q2. Debt grew 11.69% while aggregate net income fell 1.29%. The headline financial expansion is therefore not evidence of equivalent real economic expansion.
That is the money illusion at the center of the PSEi 30. Nominal values rise and create the appearance of growth even when the underlying quantity or quality of economic activity does not rise proportionately. Meralco's peso electricity sales rose sharply while physical consumption barely moved. Jollibee's domestic sales grew roughly at the rate of inflation. SM Retail's nominal growth remained below inflation despite an expanding retail footprint. SMC's debt, assets, cash, and revenue expanded while earnings remained generally weak.
But the money illusion does not arise in isolation. It is the financial appearance produced by the stagflationary process. Real growth remains weak while prices rise, purchasing power is constrained, and the adjustment that would ordinarily expose the imbalance is repeatedly suppressed, redistributed, or postponed. EO 110, BSP regulatory relief, and the exchange-rate regime operate on different parts of that adjustment process. They can alter where the pressure appears without eliminating the underlying constraint.
The result is a displacement of adjustment. It appears in prices, volumes, product quality, margins, investment, debt, and refinancing. What cannot be absorbed through the price is absorbed through quantity; what cannot be absorbed through quantity is absorbed through quality or margins; what cannot be absorbed operationally can migrate onto the balance sheet. Financial expansion can therefore continue even while real economic expansion remains weak.
That is what the PSEi 30 adds to the stagflation series. The corporate sector does not merely reflect weak growth and inflation; its balance sheets show how the economy is absorbing the adjustment. Nominal revenue can surge while real demand stagnates. Debt can expand while earnings weaken. Financial claims can accumulate while productive capacity and real output lag behind.
The price can be suppressed. The adjustment cannot.
The PSEi 30 is where that adjustment becomes visible in corporate form: stagflation underneath, money illusion on the surface, and balance-sheet expansion in between.
____
References:
Prudent Investor, Stagflation Part 14: Q2 GDP at 2.3% and Falling — A GDP Built on Suppression and Debt, August 9, 2026
Prudent Investor, Stagflation Part 13: Record Twin Deficits Signal the Cost of Deferred Adjustment, August 2, 2026
Prudent Investor, Inside the SMC–Meralco–AEV Energy Deal: Asset Transfers That Mask a Systemic Fragility Loop, November 23, 2025
Prudent Investor, The Oligarchic Bailout Everyone Missed: How the Energy Fragility Now Threatens the Philippine Peso and the Economy, December 7, 2025
Luc Lelièvre, Why Stable Systems Fail: The Illusion of Institutional Control, Mises.org, May 18, 2026
