There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved—Ludwig von Mises
In this issue:
Whac-a-Mole Economics: The Week the Philippine Financial Markets Cracked
I. The Peso and Bonds Send the Bill
II. Intervention Meets Its Limits
III. When Liquidity Loses Its Punch
IV. Whac-a-Mole Is a Displacement Mechanism
V. The PSEi’s Engineered Pumps Amidst Worsening Breadth
VI. Conclusion: Cracks in the Feedback Loop, The Bursting Bubble in Motion
Whac-a-Mole Economics: The Week the Philippine Financial Markets Cracked
The peso broke records, sovereign yields broke out, and the PSEi needed another round of mechanical props.
Figure 1
There is little appreciation of how eventful this week was for Philippine financial markets. Three pressure points flashed warning signals almost simultaneously: the peso, government bonds, and equities. (Figure 1, upper window)
I. The Peso and Bonds Send the Bill
USDPHP hit a record 62.90 on Thursday and closed Friday at 62.801. It was the 26th record-high milestone of 2026. As the records multiply, day-on-day changes have compressed while volume has remained moderate. (Figure 1, lower image)
A market discovering a price produces wider ranges as it travels. A market being walked produces tight ranges at each new level. The pattern is consistent with managed price adjustment. Simply put, this is intervention.
Figure 2
September 2026's GIR figures—$100 billion, a three year low—offer another clue to the cost of that management: The BSP’s FX policy regime is eroding. (Figure 2, topmost pane)
Meanwhile, most of the BVAL yield curve broke its April–May 2026 peak, into multi-year highs. The 20- and 25-year yields surged 69.26 and 70.38 basis points for the week. (Figure 2, middle visual)
Treasury bills jumped too: 36.31 bps for one month, 24.03 bps for three months, and 26.72 bps for six months. Intermediate maturities, from one to seven years, rose by 5.11 to 25.03 bps.
Each cluster prices a different risk. The belly prices inflation. The bills price a BSP that will have to follow with hikes. (Figure 2, lowest graph)
The 20-to-25-year sector must be held by someone willing to carry duration with no policy backstop, so it is the market price of fiscal credibility.
The ten-year yield slipped below 8% on Friday to 7.8737%, but remained above its May 20 high of 7.8094%. The 20- and 25-year yields, at 8.1976% and 8.2003%, are well past their recent highs. The pattern points to bearish steepening, driven primarily by the long end.
Essentially, the long end prices the state itself: expected inflation, future financing needs, and the premium investors demand to carry sovereign duration
Figure 3
The thin market is part of the finding, not an excuse for it. Daily Treasury turnover has been weakening with daily turnover headed toward 2024 levels. (Figure 3, upper diagram)
September's PDS-reported volume of Php 613.8 billion was the lowest of 2026, below the 2024 monthly average. Simply put, yields rose even as turnover fell or mounting losses have led to reduced transactions. This is also a sign of the corrosion of savings.
Notwithstanding, the timing is awkward for the BSP's J.P. Morgan emerging-market bond inclusion plan. Peso-denominated government and corporate bonds will adopt international pricing conventions for settlement effective January 4, 2027. The plumbing is being built just as bond prices fall at home and abroad. Amazing.
Leave no doubt, better infrastructure does not mechanically buy better prices.
The bond vigilantes need not stage a rebellion. They only need to charge more for financing the state.
II. Intervention Meets Its Limits
The convenient explanations are already available: fare hikes, September's 7.2% CPI, the August employment bounce, elevated oil prices, foreign bond vigilantes, and September's second-largest GIR decline of the year, driven by other reserve assets (ORA) and gold.
These matter. But they are triggers and symptoms, not the entire panorama.
But the most critical force—the unseen—is the domestic ledger.
Global rates set the tide; they do not determine the entire slope of a local yield curve, because the slope is where local risk resides.
With Q3 closed, quarter-end spending and financing requirements add to a fiscal position already burdened by record debt and twin deficits, as discussed in Stagflation Part 17.
The bond’s long end is reading the domestic ledger.
III. When Liquidity Loses Its Punch
The credit market offers another clue. Philippine sovereign CDS—the cost of insuring against sovereign default—registered Asia's largest weekly widening as of October 8, according to ADB's AsianBondsOnline data, while Indonesia and Vietnam moved in mixed directions. (Figure 3, lower chart)
Figure 4
The bond market tells the same story.
The Iran war’s oil shock helped push the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield above 5.3%, before it retreated to 5.24% by this week’s close (October 9th). Yet ASEAN’s 10-year yields were comparatively subdued—except the Philippines, which crossed 8% on October 8. (Figure 4, upper image)
More significantly, the Bloomberg reported last week that Philippine bonds were the worst-performing in emerging markets since the Iran war began, losing 13% in dollar terms across an index tracking 19 emerging markets. (Figure 4, lower diagram)
To repeat, worst performing.
The 10-year yield's surge, the peso's slide, and the widening CDS spread are converging signals of Philippine-specific stress—not merely collateral damage from global tightening.
The Philippines is becoming an outlier in both sovereign credit risk and bond performance.
Think about what has actually been happening.
Global tightening is not transmitted evenly: the weakest links feel it first. As liquidity's marginal effects diminish, the periphery begins to crack, potentially transmitting stress toward the core.
This is the reverse Cantillon effect—liquidity withdrawal exposing the malinvestments and the most fragile balance sheets first that easy money had kept afloat.
Financial structures built around cheap liquidity do not adjust painlessly when that regime changes.
What looks like isolated market weakness may be structural unwinding—a clearing phase for malinvestments, not merely another market event.
IV. Whac-a-Mole Is a Displacement Mechanism
When the sustained widening savings-investment gap is papered over with administered prices, relief measures, and managed FX, the adjustment does not vanish.
It relocates to the next weakest valve.
Suppress CPI and the pressure shows up in the peso. Lean on the peso and it shows up in yields. Prop the yields and it shows up in equities. This week all three showed it at once.
V. The PSEi’s Engineered Pumps Amidst Worsening Breadth
Monday's (October 5) low-volume pump lifted the PSEi by 2.03%. The record-low peso and yield breakout then coincided with a 2.2% plunge on Thursday, bringing the index within reach of its November 14, 2025 low of 5,584. Note that this low came amidst stable yields.
Figure 5
Friday’s 1.6% rebound came from the same post-recess “afternoon delight” seen pattern seen last Monday and Thursday with ICTSI supplying a third of the day’s gain and a pre-close dump once again. (Figure 5, topmost window)
For the week, the index closed up 1.28%, or 71.96 points, with SM, AC, and MER contributing about 58.4% of the gain. (Figure 5, middle graph)
The index's 18–12 breadth contrasted with PSE-wide breadth of 431 advancers to 484 decliners, extending the deterioration in broader participation for a fifth week. (Figure 5, lowest diagram)
Average daily Main Board volume fell 23.23%, from Php 5.95 billion to Php 4.57 billion
The benchmark rose. Participation weakened.
An index lifted by three names, against a falling-volume, seller-leaning market, measures the headlines, not the economy.
Hayek's insight on dispersed knowledge applies. Prices are supposed to compress information held by millions of participants.
When benchmark mechanics steer attention and capital, the price reflects index-driven flows instead of entrepreneurial discovery, and the exchange’s allocative function degrades.
Figaro Culinary's planned delisting is the latest symptom. It joins the broader pattern of departures and proposed exits, including Asian Terminals, City & Land Developers, Robinsons Retail, and MerryMart.
Figure 6
This helps explain why the PSEi remains one of Asia's laggards despite years of easy money, why the PSE’s active investor participation has strikingly weakened, and why delistings keep accumulating. (Figure 6, upper window)
Capital markets should connect savings to productive investment, MSMEs included. Instead, the incumbent policy environment skews the playing field toward politically connected oligarchic interests.
VI. Conclusion: Cracks in the Feedback Loop, the Bursting Bubble in Motion
The PSEi’s relationship with 10-year government bond yields is more than a chart pattern. (Figure 6, lower chart)
Rising yields raise the discount rate applied to future earnings, increase financing costs, and make equities less attractive relative to fixed-income alternatives.
But the transmission runs both ways: sovereign stress also affects bank balance sheets, credit allocation, and the economy underpinning corporate earnings.
The peso, bonds, and equities are entwined through financing costs, bank balance sheets, capital allocation, and purchasing power.
Higher yields penalize the heavily indebted: the government, conglomerates, and banks financing both.
- Currency weakness raises imported-energy, food and manufacturing costs.
- Inflation squeezes real incomes, while slower economic growth makes debt service harder.
- Banks are not detached observers of fiscal stress; as counterparties, they are among its primary transmission channels.
Once again, as liquidity tightens, the weakest links are exposed first. Stress can then travel from the periphery toward the financial system's core, threatening structures built around years of cheap money.
An engineered rebound can restore certain index level/s. It cannot restore purchasing power, erase debt, or manufacture the savings investment requires.
The Whac-a-Mole game continues. The problem is that the moles are connected, and the mallet is getting heavier.
This is the bursting bubble in motion.
