Sunday, August 17, 2025

Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility

 

Debt-fueled booms all too often provide false affirmation of a government’s poli­cies, a financial institution’s ability to make outsized profits, or a country’s standard of living. Most of these booms end badly—Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 

Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility 

In this issue: 

Part 1: Earnings Erosion and the Mask of Stability

1.A NPLs Fall, But Provisions Rise: A Tale of Two Signals

1.B Philippine Bank’s Profit Growth Falters: Q2 Deficit Breaks the Streak

1.C Universal and Commercial Banks Lead the Weakness; PSE Listed Banks Echo the Slowdown

1.D Income Breakdown: Lending Boom Masks Structural Risk

1.E CMEPA’s Gambit: Taxing Time Deposits to Diversify Bank Income

1.F The Real Culprit: Exploding Losses on Financial Assets

1.G San Miguel’s Share Plunge: A Canary in the Credit Mine? Beneath the Surface: Banks Signal Stress

1.H The NPL Illusion: Velocity Masks Vulnerability

1.I Benchmark Kabuki: When Benchmark-ism Meets Market Reality

Part 2: Liquidity Strains and the Architecture of Intervention

2.A Behind the RRR Cuts: Extraordinary Bank Dependence on BSP

2.B RRR Infusions: Liquidity Metrics Rebound; Weak Money Creation Amid Record Deficit Spending

2.C Rising Borrowings Reinforce Funding Strains, Crowding Out Intensifies, Record HTM Assets

2.D Divergence: Bank Profits, GDP and the PSE’s Financial Index; Market Concentration

2.E OFCs and the Financial Index: A Coordinated Lift?

2.F Triple Liquidity Drain; Rescue Template Risks: Inflation, Stagflation, Crisis; Fiscal Reflex: Keynesian Response Looms

2.G Finale: Classic Symptoms of Late-Cycle Fragility 

Philippine Banks: June’s Financial Losses and Liquidity Strains Expose Late-Cycle Fragility 

From earnings erosion to monetary theatrics, June’s data shows a banking system caught in late-cycle strain.

Part 1: Earnings Erosion and the Mask of Stability 

1.A NPLs Fall, But Provisions Rise: A Tale of Two Signals 

Inquirer.net August Bad loans in the Philippine banking system fell to a three-month low in June, helped by the central bank’s ongoing interest rate cuts, which could ease debt servicing burden. However, lenders remain cautious and have increased their provisions to cover possible credit losses. Latest data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed nonperforming loans (NPL), or debts that are 90 days late on a payment and at risk of default, cornered 3.34 percent of the local banking industry’s total lending portfolio. That figure, called the gross NPL ratio, was the lowest since March 2025, when the ratio stood at 3.30 percent. 

But the NPL ratio masks a deeper tension: gross NPLs rose 5.5% year-on-year to Php 530.29 billion, while total loans expanded 10.93% to Php 15.88 trillion. The ratio fell not because bad loans shrank, but because credit growth outpaced them. 

Loan loss reserves rose 5.5% to Php 505.91 billion, and the NPL coverage ratio ticked up to 95.4%. Past due loans climbed 9.17% to Php 670.5 billion, and restructured loans rose 6.27%. Provisioning for credit losses ballooned to Php 84.19 billion in 1H 2025, with Php 43.78 billion booked in Q2 alone—the largest since Q4 2020’s pandemic-era spike. 

So, while the establishment cites falling NPL ratios to reassure the public, banks are quietly bracing for defaults and valuation hits—likely tied to large corporate exposures. The provisioning surge is a tacit admission: risk is rising, even if it hasn’t yet surfaced in headline metrics.

1.B Philippine Bank’s Profit Growth Falters: Q2 Deficit Breaks the Streak


Figure 1

Philippine banks posted their first quarterly profit contraction in Q2 2025, down -1.96% YoY—a sharp reversal from Q1’s 10.64% growth and Q2 2024’s 5.21%. This marks the first decline since Q3 2023’s -11.75%. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Even more telling, since the BSP’s historic rescue of the banking system in Q2 2021, net profit growth has been trending downward. Peso profits etched a record in Q1 2025, but fell in Q2. 

The Q2 slump dragged down 1H performance: bank profit growth slipped to 4.14%, compared to 2H 2024’s 9.77%, though slightly higher than 1H 2024’s 4.1%. 

1.C Universal and Commercial Banks Lead the Weakness; PSE Listed Banks Echo the Slowdown 

Earnings growth of universal-commercial (UC) banks sank from 8.6% in Q1 2025 to a -2.11% deficit in Q2. 

UC bank profits grew 6.33% in Q2 2024. Still, UC banks eked out a 3.1% gain in 1H 2025 versus 5.3% in the same period last year. UC banks accounted for 93.1% of total banking system profits in 1H 2025—underscoring their dominance or concentration but also their vulnerability. 

PSE listed banks partially echoed BSP data. (Figure 1, Lower Table) 

Aggregate earnings growth for all listed banks hit 6.08% in Q2 and 6.77% in 1H—down from 10.43% and 9.95% in the same periods last year. The top three banks in the PSEi 30 (BDO, BPI, MBT) reported combined earnings growth of 4.3% in Q2 and 5.31% in 1H 2025, substantially lower compared to 13.71% and 15.4% in 2024. 

The discrepancy between BSP and listed bank data likely stems from government, foreign, and unlisted UC banks—whose performance may be masking broader stress. 

1.D Income Breakdown: Lending Boom Masks Structural Risk 

What explains the sharp profit downturn?


Figure 2

Net interest income rose 11.74% in Q2, while non-interest income increased 14.7%—slightly higher than Q1’s 11.7% and 14.5%, respectively. However, net interest income was lower than Q2 2024’s 14.74%, while non-interest income rebounded from -5.71% in the same period. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

In 1H 2025, net interest income grew 11.7%, and non-interest income rose 14.6%, compared to 15.53% and -8.83% in 1H 2024. Net interest income now accounts for 82.5% of total bank profits—a fresh high, reflecting the lending boom regardless of BSP’s rate levels. 

This share has reversed course since 2013, rising from ~60% to 77% by end-2024—driven by BSP’s easy money policy and historic pandemic-era rescue efforts. Banks’ income structure resembles a Pareto distribution: highly concentrated, and extremely susceptible to duration and credit risks. 

BSP’s easing cycle has not only failed to improve banks’ core business, but actively contributed to its decay.

1.E CMEPA’s Gambit: Taxing Time Deposits to Diversify Bank Income 

The government’s response has been the Capital Market Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA). CMEPA, effective July 2025, imposes a flat 20% final withholding tax on all deposit interest income, including long-term placements. 

By taxing time deposits, policymakers aim to push savers into capital markets, boosting bank non-interest income through fees, trading, and commissions. But in reality, this is financial engineering. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

With weak household savings and low financial literacy, deposit outflows will likely shrink banks’ funding base rather than diversify their revenues. 

It would increase time preferences, leading the public to needlessly take risks or gamble—further eroding savings. 

Or, instead of reducing fragility, CMEPA risks layering volatile market income on top of an already over-concentrated interest income model. 

We’ve previously addressed CMEPA—refer to earlier posts for context (see below) 

1.F The Real Culprit: Exploding Losses on Financial Assets 

Beyond this structural weakness, the real culprit behind the downturn was losses on financial assets. 

In Q2 2025, banks posted Php 43.78 billion in losses—the largest since the pandemic recession in Q4 2020—driven by Php 49.3 billion in provisions for credit losses!  (Figure 2, lowest image) 

For 1H 2025, losses ballooned 64% to Php 73.6 billion, with provisions reaching Php 84.19 billion. 

Once again, this provisioning surge is a tacit admission: while officials cite falling NPL ratios, banks themselves are bracing for valuation hits and potential defaults, likely tied to concentrated corporate exposures. 

1.G San Miguel’s Share Plunge: A Canary in the Credit Mine? Beneath the Surface: Banks Signal Stress


Figure 3

Could this be linked to the recent collapse in San Miguel [PSE: SMC] shares? 

SMC plunged 14.54% WoW (Week on Week) as of August 15th, compounding its YTD losses to 35.4%. (Figure 3, upper diagram) 

And this share waterfall happened before its Q2 17Q 2025 release, which showed debt slipping slightly from Php 1.511 trillion in Q1 to Php 1.504 trillion in 1H—suggesting that the intensifying selloff may have been driven by deeper concerns. (Figure 3, lower visual) 

SMC’s Q2 (17Q) report reveals increasingly opaque cash generation, aggressive financial engineering, and unclear asset quality and debt servicing capacity. 

Yet, paradoxically, Treasury yields softened across the curve—hinting at either covert BSP intervention through its institutional cartel, a dangerous underestimation of contagion risk, or market complacency—a lull before the credit repricing storm. 

If SMC’s debt is marked at par or held to maturity, deterioration in its credit profile wouldn’t show up as market losses—but would require provisioning. This provisioning surge is a tacit admission: banks are seeing heightened risk, even if it’s not yet reflected in NPL ratios or market pricing. 

We saw this coming. Prior breakdowns on SMC are archived below. 

Of course, this SMC–banking sector inference linkage still requires corroborating evidence or forensic validation—time will tell.

Still, one thing is clear: banks are exhibiting mounting stress—underscoring the BSP’s resolve to intensify its easing cycle through rate cuts, RRR reductions, deposit insurance hikes, and a soft USDPHP peg. The ‘Marcos-nomics’ debt-financed deficit spending adds fiscal fuel to this monetary response. 

1.H The NPL Illusion: Velocity Masks Vulnerability


Figure 4

NPLs can be a deceptive measure of bank health. Residual regulatory reliefs from the pandemic era may still distort classifications, and the ratio itself reflects the relative velocity of bad loans versus credit expansion. 

Both gross NPLs and total loans hit record highs in peso terms in June—Php 530.29 billion and Php 15.88 trillion, respectively—but credit growth outpaced defaults, keeping the NPL ratio artificially low at 3.34%. (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

The logic is simple: to suppress the NPL ratio, loan velocity must accelerate faster than the accumulation of bad debt. Once credit expansion stalls, the entire kabuki collapses—and latent systemic stress will surface. 

1.I Benchmark Kabuki: When Benchmark-ism Meets Market Reality 

This is where benchmark-ism hits the road—and skids. The system’s metrics, once propped up by interventionist theatrics, are now showing signs of exhaustion. 

These are not isolated anomalies, but worsening symptoms of prior rescues—now overrun by the law of diminishing returns. 

And yet, the response is more of the same: fresh interventions to mask the decay of earlier ones. Theatrics, once effective at shaping perception, are now being challenged by markets that no longer play along. 

The system’s health doesn’t hinge on ratios—it hinges on velocity. Velocity of credit, of confidence, of liquidity. When that velocity falters, the metrics unravel. 

And beneath the unraveling lies a fragility that no benchmark can disguise. 

Part 2: Liquidity Strains and the Architecture of Intervention

2.A Behind the RRR Cuts: Extraordinary Bank Dependence on BSP 

There are few signs that the public grasps the magnitude of developments unfolding in Philippine banks. 

The aggregate 450 basis point Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) cuts in October 2024 and March 2025 mark the most aggressive liquidity release in BSP history—surpassing even its pandemic-era response. (Figure 4, middle chart) 

Unlike previous easing cycles (2018–2019, 2020), where banks barely tapped BSP liquidity, the current drawdown has been dramatic

As of July, banks had pulled Php 463 billion since October 2024 from the BSP (Claims on Other Depository Corporations)—Php 84.6 billion since March and Php 189.2 billion in June. Notably, 40.9% of the Php 463 billion liquidity drawdown occurred in July alone. 

This surge coincides with mounting losses on financial assets and record peso NPLs—masked by rapid credit expansion, which may be a euphemism for refinancing deteriorating debt. Banks’ lending to bad borrowers to prevent NPL classification is a familiar maneuver. 

When banks incur significant financial losses—whether from rising NPLs, credit impairments, or mark-to-market declines—the immediate impact is not just weaker earnings but a widening hole in their funding structure. The December 2020 episode, when the system booked its largest financial losses, highlighted how such shocks create a liquidity vacuum: instead of recycling liquidity through lending and market channels, banks are forced to patch internal shortfalls, draining capital buffers and eroding interbank trust. 

Into this vacuum steps the BSP. Reserve requirement cuts, while framed as policy easing, have functioned less as a growth stimulus and more as a liquidity lifeline. By drawing on their balances with the BSP, banks convert regulatory reserves into working liquidity—filling gaps left by financial losses. The outcome is growing dependence on central bank support: what appears as easing is in fact the manifestation of extraordinary support, with liquidity migrating from market sources to the BSP’s balance sheet. 

This hidden dependence underscores how financial repression has hollowed out market-based liquidity, leaving the BSP as the primary lender of first resort 

2.B RRR Infusions: Liquidity Metrics Rebound; Weak Money Creation Amid Record Deficit Spending

The liquidity drawdown has filtered into banks’ cash positions. As of June, peso cash reserves rebounded—though still down 19.8% year-on-year. Cash-to-deposit ratios rose from 9.87% in May to 10.67% in June, while liquid assets-to-deposits climbed from 47.29% to 49.24%. (Figure 4, lowest image)


Figure 5

RRR-driven cash infusions also lifted deposits. Total deposit growth rebounded from 4.96% in May to 5.91% in June, led by peso deposits (3.96% to 6.3%) and supported by FX deposits (4.42% to 6.8%). (Figure 5, topmost graph) 

Yet paradoxically, despite a 10.9% expansion in Total Loan Portfolio and ODC drawdown, deposits only managed modest growth—suggesting a liquidity black hole. CMEPA’s impact may deepen this imbalance. 

Despite record deficit spending in 1H 2025, BSP currency issuance/currency in circulation growth slowed from 9% in June to 8.1% in July, after peaking at 14.7% in May during election spending. Substantial money creation has not translated into higher CPI or GDP, and the slowdown suggests a growing demand problem. (Figure 5, middle diagram) 

Even with July’s massive ODC drawdown, BSP’s cash in circulation suggests a financial cesspool has been absorbing liquidity—offsetting whatever expansionary efforts are underway. 

2.C Rising Borrowings Reinforce Funding Strains, Crowding Out Intensifies, Record HTM Assets 

After a brief slowdown in May, bank borrowings surged anew by 24% in June to Php 1.85 trillion, nearing the March record of Php 1.91 trillion. Escalating liquidity strains are pushing banks to increase funding from capital markets. (Figure 5, lowest pane) 

This intensifies the crowding-out effect, as banks compete with the government and private sector for access to public savings.


Figure 6

Meanwhile, as predicted, record-high public debt has translated to greater bank financing of government via Net Claims on the Central Government, showing up in banks’ record-high Held-to-Maturity (HTM) assetsHTM assets have become a prime contributor to tightening liquidity strains in the banking system. (Figure 6, topmost graph) 

2.D Divergence: Bank Profits, GDP and the PSE’s Financial Index; Market Concentration 

Despite slowing profit growth, the PSE’s Financial Index—composed of 7 banks (BDO, BPI, MBT, CBC, AUB, PNB, SECB) plus the PSE—hit a historic high in Q1 2025, before dipping slightly in Q2. (Figure 6, middle visual)

Meanwhile, the sector’s real GDP partially echoed profits, reinforcing the case of a downturn. 

Financial GDP dropped sharply from 6.9% in Q1 2025 and 8% in Q2 2024 to 5.6% in Q2 2025. It accounted for 10.4% of national GDP in Q2, down from the all-time high of 11.7% in Q1—signaling deeper financialization of the economy. (Figure 6, lowest chart)


Figure 7

Bank GDP slowed to 3.7% in Q2 from 4.9% in Q1 2025, far below the 10.2% growth of Q2 2024. Since Q1 2015, bank GDP has averaged nearly half (49.9%) of the sector’s GDP. (Figure 7, topmost window) 

Thanks to the BSP’s historic rescue, the free-float market cap weight of the top three banks (BDO, BPI, MBT) in the PSEi 30 rose from 12.76% in August 2020 to 24.37% by mid-April 2025. As of August 15, their share stood at 21.8%, rising to 23.2% when CBC is included. (Figure 7, middle chart) 

This concentration has cushioned the PSEi 30 from broader declines—suggesting possible non-market interventions in bank share prices, while amplifying concentration risk. 

2.E OFCs and the Financial Index: A Coordinated Lift? 

BSP data on Other Financial Corporations (OFCs) reveals a dovetailing of ODC activity with the Financial Index. OFCs—comprising non-money market funds, financial auxiliaries, insurance firms, pension funds, and money lenders—appear to be accumulating bank shares, possibly at BSP’s implicit behest. 

In Q1 2024, BSP noted: "the sector’s claims on depository corporations rose amid the increase in its deposits with banks and holdings of bank-issued equity shares." 

This suggests a coordinated effort to prop up bank share prices—masking underlying stress. (Figure 7, lowest graph) 

Once a bear market strikes key bank shares and the financial index, losses will add to liquidity stress. Economic reality will eventually expose the choreography propping up both the PSEi 30 and banks. 

2.F Triple Liquidity Drain; Rescue Template Risks: Inflation, Stagflation, Crisis; Fiscal Reflex: Keynesian Response Looms 

In short, three sources of liquidity strain now pressure Philippine banks:

  • Record holdings of Held-to-Maturity assets
  • Rising Financial losses
  • All-time high non-performing loans 

If BSP resorts to its 2020–2021 pandemic rescue template, expect the USDPHP to soar, inflation to spike, and rates to rise—ushering in stagflation or even possibly a debt crisis. 

With the private sector under duress from mounting bad credit, authorities—guided by top-down Keynesian ideology—are likely to resort to fiscal stimulus to boost GDP and ramp up revenue efforts. 

2.G Finale: Classic Symptoms of Late-Cycle Fragility 

The Philippine banking system is showing unmistakable signs of late-cycle fragility.

Velocity-dependent metrics are poised to unravel once credit growth stalls. Liquidity dependence is paraded as resilience. Market support mechanisms blur price discovery. Policy reflexes recycle past interventions while ignoring structural cracks. 

Losses are being papered over with liquidity, fiscal deficits are substituting for private demand, and the veneer of stability rests on central bank backstops. This choreography cannot hold indefinitely. If current trajectories persist, the risks are stark: stagflation, currency instability, and a potential debt spiral. 

The metrics are clear. The real story lies in the erosion of velocity and the quiet migration from market discipline to state lifelines. What appears resilient today may be revealed tomorrow as fragility sustained on borrowed time. 

As the saying goes: we live in interesting times. 

____

Prudent Investor Newsletter Archives: 

1 San Miguel

Just among the many…

2 CMEPA


Sunday, August 10, 2025

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy

 


National product statistics have been used widely in recent years as a reflection of the total product of society and even to indicate the state of “economic welfare.” These statistics cannot be used to frame or test economic theory, for one thing because they are an inchoate mixture of grossness and netness and because no objectively measurable “price level” exists that can be used as an accurate “deflator” to obtain statistics of some form of aggregate physical output. National product statistics, however, may be useful to the economic historian in describing or analyzing an historical period. Even so, they are highly misleading as currently used—Murray N. Rothbard 

 

In this issue: A brief but blistering breakdown of the 5.5% GDP mirage. 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono?

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

The 5.5% Q2 GDP Mirage: How Debt-Fueled Deficit Spending Masks a Slowing Economy 

Beneath the headline print lies a fragile economy propped up by CPI suppression, statistical distortion, and unsustainable public outlays.

I. Q2 GDP: A Mirage of Momentum 

The Philippines clocked in a Q2 GDP of 5.5% — higher than Q1 2025’s 5.4% but lower than Q2 2024’s 6.5%. 

For the first half, GDP posted a 5.4% expansion, above the 5.2% of the second half of 2024 but still below the 6.2% seen in the first half of 2024.


Figure 1

While this was largely in line with consensus expectations, what is rarely mentioned is that both nominal and real GDP remain locked to a weaker post-2020 secondary trendline — a legacy of the pandemic recession. (Figure 1, topmost graph) 

II. The Secondary Trendline: Pandemic’s Lingering Scar; GDP: A Flawed Lens, Still Worshipped 

Contra the establishment narrative, this lower secondary trend illustrates a slowing pace of increases—a theme we’ve repeatedly flagged. 

GDP now appears to be testing its own support level, underscoring the fragility of this fledgling trendline and the risk of a downside break. 

Though we’re not fans of GDP as a concept, we analyze it within the dominant lens—because everyone else treats it as gospel. 

But let’s be clear: GDP is a base effect—a percentage change from comparative output or expenditure figures from the same period a year ago. 

III. Economic Wet Dreams, Statistical Kabuki and Confirmation Bias 

When pundits claim GDP will breach 6% or that the Philippines is nearing “upper middle class” status, they’re implying that aside from seasonal Q4 strength, the rest of the year will recapture the original trendline and stay there. What a wet dream! 

These forecasts come from either practitioners afflicted by the Dunning-Kruger syndrome or sheer propagandists. 

The PSA’s national accounts data offer contradictory insights. But this isn’t just about statistics—it’s about confirmation bias. The public is told what it wants to hear. 

IV. The GDP Illusion, Poverty Amid Growth: Cui Bono? 

GDP is a quantitative estimate—built on assumptions, inputs, and econometric calculations. It hopes to objectively capture facts on the ground, but in aggregate, it overlooks individual preferences, distributional effects, financing mechanisms, and policy responses. 

Worse, its components (from rice to cars to Netflix) are averaged in ways that can distort reality. Aside, input or computational errors, or even manipulation, are always possible. 

Yes, GDP may be 5.5%, but SWS’s June self-rated poverty survey still shows 49% of Filipino families identifying as poor, with 10% on the borderline. While this is sharply down from December 2024’s 63%, the numbers remain considerable. (Figure 1, middle image) 

So, who benefits from the recent inflation decline that distilled into a 5.5% GDP? 

At a glance, the 41%—but even within this group, gains are uneven. Or, even within the 41% who are “non-poor,” gains are concentrated among larger winners while most see only modest improvements (see conclusion) 

V. Policy Theater, the Real Economy and The Credit–Consumption Black Hole 

The real economy doesn’t operate in a vacuum. It is a product of interactions shaped by both incumbent and anticipated socio-political and economic policies. 

The BSP began its easing cycle in 2H 2024, delivering four rate cuts (the fifth in June), two reserve requirement ratio cuts, doubled deposit insurance, a soft peg defense of the peso, and a new property benchmark that eviscerated real estate deflation

Theoretically, the economy ought to be functioning within a policy ‘sweet spot’. 

Despite blistering nominal growth and record-high universal-commercial bank credit—driven by consumer lending—real GDP barely budged. (Figure 1, lowest pane) 

Interest rates were hardly a constraint. Bank lending surged even during the 2022–23 rate hikes. Yet the policy transmission mechanism seems blunted: credit expansion hasn’t translated into consumer spending, rising prices or real GDP growth. 

Banking sector balance sheets suggest a black hole between credit and the economy—likely a repercussion of overleveraging or mounting balance sheet imbalances. 

More financial easing won’t fix this bottleneck. It’ll worsen it. 

VI. Jobs Boom, GDP Drag


Figure 2

We’re also treated to the spectacle of near-record employment. In June, the employed population reached its second-highest level since December 2023, driving the employment rate to 96.3% and lifting Q2’s average to 96.11%. 

That should be good news. But is it? If so, why has headline GDP moved in the opposite direction? (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

This labor boom coincided with over 25% credit card growth—normally a recipe for inflation (too much money chasing too few goods). (Figure 2, middle visual)

Instead, CPI fell, averaging just 1.4% in Q2. Near-record employment met falling prices, with barely a whisper from the consensus about softening demand. (Figure 2, lowest diagram)

VII. Policy Vaudeville: July .9% Inflation, MSRP and the Php 20 Rice Rollout

Authorities reported July inflation at 0.9%—approaching 2019 lows. But this is statistical kabuki, driven by price controls and weak demand.


Figure 3

Rice prices, partly due to imports, were already falling before January’s MSRP. The Php 20 rice rollout only deepened the deflation. (Figure 3, topmost diagram)

July saw rice prices drop 15.9%. Despite earlier MSRP, meat prices remained elevated—9.1% in June, 8.8% in July.

Because rice carries an 8.87% weight in the CPI basket, its deflation dragged down Food CPI (34.78% weight), driving July’s headline CPI to 2019 lows.

This divergence reveals the optics. MSRP failed on pork, so it was quietly lifted. But for rice, it was spun as policy success—piggybacking on slowing demand, punctuated by the Php 20 rollout even though it simply reinforced a downtrend already in motion.

VIII. Core vs Headline CPI: A Divergence Worth Watching

The growing gap between core and headline CPI is telling. The negative spread is now the widest since June 2022. Historically, persistent negative spreads have signaled inflection points—2015–16, 2019–2020, 2023. (Figure 3, middle window)

Moreover, MoM changes in the non-food and energy core CPI suggest consolidation and its potential terminal phase. An impending breakout looms—implying rising prices across a broader range of goods. (Figure 3, lowest graph)

IX. Deflator Manipulation, GDP Inflation 

Here’s the kicker: statistical histrionics are inflating GDP by repressing the deflator.

Real GDP is not a raw measure of economic output—it’s a ratio: nominal GDP divided by the GDP deflator. That deflator reflects price levels across the economy. Push the deflator down, and—voilĂ —real GDP pops up, even if nominal growth hasn’t changed. 

Q2’s 5.5% real GDP print looks better partly because the deflator was suppressed by statistical and policy factors: rice imports, price controls, Php 20 rice rollouts or targeted subsidies, and peso defense all helped drag reported inflation to multi-year lows. Rice alone, with an 8.87% CPI weight, deflated nearly 16% in July, pulling down the broader food CPI and, by extension, the GDP deflator. 

If the deflator had stayed closer to its Q1 level, Q2 real GDP would likely have landed closer to the 4.5–4.8% range—well below the official figure. This isn’t economic magic; it’s arithmetic. The “growth” came not from a sudden burst in output, but from lowering the measuring stick. 

Q2 GDP is another "benchmark-ism" in action. 

X. Inflation-GDP Forecasting as Folklore 

Amused by media’s enthrallment with government inflation forecasts, we noted at X.com: "Inflation forecasting is the game of ‘pin the tail on the donkey’ — a guess on a statistical guess, dressed up as science. The mainstream reinforces an Overton-window narrative that serves more as diversion than insight" 

The real economy—fragile, bifurcated, and policy-distorted—remains unseen.

XI. The Official Narrative: A Celebration of Minor Gains 

The establishment line, echoed by Reuters and Philstar, goes something like this: 

"Slowing inflation also helped support household consumption, which rose 5.5% year-on-year in the second quarter, the fastest pace since the first quarter of 2023" … 

"Faster farm output and strong consumer spending helped the Philippine economy expand by 5.5 percent in the second quarter"


Figure 4

But beneath the headlines lies a more sobering truth: a one-basis-point rise in household spending growth has been heralded as a “critical factor” behind the GDP expansion. 

While the statement is factually correct, it masks the reality: household spending as a share of GDP has been rangebound since 2023, showing no real breakout in momentum

XII. The Real Driver: Government Spending, Not Households 

The true engine of Q2 GDP was government spending, which rose 8.7%, down from 18.7% in Q1 but still dominant. (Figure 4, topmost window) 

Over the past five quarters, government spending has averaged 10.7%, dwarfing household consumption’s 5.1%.  

This imbalance exposes the fragility of the consumer-led growth narrative. When per capita metrics are used, the illusion fades further: Real household per capita GDP was just 4.5% in Q2, barely above Q1’s 4.4%, and well below Q1 2023’s 5.5%.

This per capita trend has been flatlining at secondary trendline support, locked in an L-shaped pattern—inertia, not resurgence—and still drifting beneath its pre-pandemic exponential trend.  The per capita household consumption “L-shape” shows spending per person collapsing during the pandemic and never meaningfully recovering — a flatline that belies the GDP growth narrative. (Figure 4, middle graph)

XIII. The Consumer Illusion: Retail as a Misleading Proxy

Despite the BSP’s promotion of property prices as a proxy for consumer health—and the Overton Window’s deafening hallelujahs—SM Prime’s Q2 results reveal persistent consumer strain: (Figure 4, lowest chart) 

  • Rent revenues rose only 6.3%, the weakest since the pandemic recession in Q1 2021.
  • Property sales stagnated, up just 0.2% despite new malls in 2024 and 2025 

So much for the “strong consumer” thesis. 

XIV. Expenditure Breakdown: Only Government Spending Beat the Headline 

In the PSA’s real GDP expenditure table, only government spending exceeded the headline:

  • Household: 5.5%
  • Gross capital formation: 0.6%
  • Exports: 4.4%
  • Imports: 2.9%
  • Government: 8.7% 

Notably, government spending excludes public construction and private allocations to public projects (e.g., PPPs). Due to the May mid-term elections, real public construction GDP collapsed by 8.2%. 

XV. Inconvenient Truth: The Rise of Big Government—Crowding Out in Action, The Establishment’s Blind Spots and Tunnel Vision

Figure 5

The first half of 2025 exposes a structural shift the mainstream won’t touch:  Government spending’s share of GDP has surged to an all-time high! 

Meanwhile, consumer driven GDP continues its long descent—down since 2001. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

As the public sector’s footprint swells, the private sector’s relative role contracts. This isn’t theoretical crowding out. It’s empirical. It’s unfolding in real time. (Figure 5, middle image) 

Importantly, this is not a conspiracy theory—these are government’s own data. Yet the establishment’s analysts and bank economists appear blind to it. 

Proof? 

Banks are shifting focus toward consumer lending, even as the consumer share of GDP trends lower. 

The “build-and-they-will-come” crowd remains locked in a form of tunnel vision, steadfastly clinging to a decaying trend. 

XVI. More Inconvenient Truths: Debt-Fueled GDP—A Statistical Shell Game 

Government has no wealth of its own. It extracts from the productive sector—through taxes, borrowing (future taxes), and inflation. 

As Big Government expands, so does public debt — now at Php 17.3 trillion as of June! 

The June debt increase annualizes to Php 1.784 trillion — eerily close to the Php 1.954 trillion NGDP gain over the past four quarters (Q3 2024–Q2 2025). (Figure 5, lowest visual)

Figure 6 

That’s a mere Php 170 billion gap. Translation: debt accounts for 91.3% of NGDP’s statistical value-added. 

The 91.3% “debt as share of NGDP increase” means almost all of the year-on-year nominal GDP expansion came from government borrowing, not private sector growth — in other words, strip out the deficit spending, and the economy’s headline size barely moved. 

Yet this spread has collapsed to its lowest level since the pandemic recession. (Figure 6, upper pane) 

This isn’t growth. It’s leverage masquerading as output — GDP propped up almost entirely by deficit spending! 

This also reinforces the government’s drift toward centralization—where state expansion becomes the default engine of the economy. 

XVII. The Debt-Deficit Trap: No Way Out Without Pain—Sugarcoating Future Pain 

It’s unrealistic for the administration to claim it can “slowly bring down” debt while GDP remains tethered to deficit spending. 

Debt-to-GDP ratios are used to soothe public concern—but the same debt is inflating GDP through government outlays. It’s a circular metric: the numerator props up the denominator

According to the Bureau of Treasury, Debt-to-GDP hit 63.1% in Q2 2025—highest since 2005! 

Ironically, authorities quietly raised the debt-to-GDP threshold from 60% to 70% in Augustan implicit admission that the old ceiling is no longer defensible

This is a borrow-now, pay-later model. Short-term optics are prioritized, while future GDP is sacrificed. 

Even the PSA’s long-term trendline reflects this dragconfirming the trajectory of diminishing returns. 

And we haven’t even touched banking debt expansion, which should have supported both government and elite private sector financing. Instead, it’s compounding systemic fragility. 

We’re no fans of government statistics—but even their own numbers tell the story. Cherry-picking to sugarcoat the truth isn’t analysis. It’s deception. And it won’t hide the pain of massive malinvestments. 

XVIII. Tail-End Sectors Surge: Agriculture and Real Estate Rebound 

From the industry side, Q2 saw surprising strength from GDP’s tailenders: 

Agriculture GDP spiked 7%, the highest since Q2 2011’s 8.3%. Volatile by nature, such spikes often precede plunges. 

Real estate GDP nearly doubled from Q1’s 3.7% to 6.1%, though still below Q2 2024’s 7.7%. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

Yet initial reports of listed property developers tell a different story: 

-Aggregate real estate sales: +4.1% (Megaworld +10.5%, Filinvest -4.96%, SMPH +0.02%) 

-Total revenues: +5.23% (Megaworld +9.6%, Filinvest -1.2%, SMPH +3.83%)

These figures lag behind nominal GDP’s 7.9%, suggesting statistical embellishment aligned with BSP’s agenda. 

Benchmark-ism strikes again!  

XIX. The Policy Sweet Spot—and Its Expiry Date: Diminishing Returns of Stimulus 

Technically, Q2 and 1H mark the ‘sweet spot’ of policy stimulus—BSP’s easy money paired with fiscal expansion. But artificial boosts yield diminishing returns

A 5.5% print reveals fragility more than resilience. 

Once again, the entrenched reliance on debt-financed deficit spending inflates GDP at the expense of future stability—while compounding systemic risk.  

XX. Conclusion: Narrative Engineering and the Keynesian Free Lunch Trap 

GDP has been sculpted to serve the establishment’s preferred storyline: 

  • CPI suppression to inflate real GDP
  • Overstated gains in agriculture and real estate
  • Escalating reliance on deficit spending 

Repressing CPI to pad GDP isn’t stewardship—it’s pantomine. A calculated communication strategy designed to preserve public confidence through statistical theater

Within this top-down, social-democratic Keynesian spending framework, the objective is unmistakable: Cheap access to household savings to bankroll political vanity projectsThese are the hallmarks of free lunch politics

The illusion of growth props up the illusion of competence. And both are running on borrowed time. 

Yet, who benefits from this GDP? 

Not the average household. Not the productive base. As The Inquirer.net reports: "The combined wealth of the country’s 50 richest rose by more than 6 percent to $86 billion this year from $80.8 billion in 2024, as the economy got some lift from robust domestic demand and higher infrastructure investments, according to Forbes magazine." 

GDP growth has become a redistribution mechanism—upward. A scoreboard for elite extraction, not shared prosperity. 

Without restraint on free lunch politics, the Philippines is barreling toward a debt crisis. 

XXI. Post Script: The Market’s Quiet Rebuttal: Flattening Curve Exposes GDP Mirage 

Despite headline growth figures and establishment commentary echoing official optimism, institutional traders—both local and foreign—remain unconvinced by the Overton Window of managed optimism rhetoric. 

The market’s posture suggests skepticism toward the government’s narrative of resilience.


Figure 7 

Following a Q2 steepening (end-June Q2 vs. end-March Q1), the Philippine Treasury curve has flattened in August (mid-Q3), though it remains steep in absolute terms. While the curve remains steep overall, the recent shift reveals important nuances: 

Short end (T-bills): August T-bill yields are marginally lower than June Q2 but still above March Q1 levels. 

Belly (3–5 years): Rates have been largely static or inert, showing no strong conviction on medium-term growth or market indecision 

Long end (10 years): Yields have fallen sharply since March and June, suggesting softer growth expectations or rising demand for duration. 

Ultra-long (20–25 years): Rates remain elevated and sticky, reflecting structural fiscal and inflation concerns. 

After July’s 0.9% CPI print, the peso staged a brief rally, yet the USDPHP remains above its March lows. Meanwhile, 3-month T-bill rates softened slightly post-CPI, hinting at the BSP’s intent to maintain its easing stance. 

Q3’s bearish flattening underscores rising risks of economic slowdown amid stubborn inflation or stagflation. 

The divergence between market pricing and statistical growth exposes the mirage of Q2 GDP—more optical than operational, more narrative than organic.

  

Sunday, August 3, 2025

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock


In the final analysis, it’s just central banks printing money, reducing its value and causing inflation as they support dishonest governments that refuse to be fiscally responsible and continually run massive deficits. Such policies flow from the “elite’s” greed and their insatiable thirst for power, benefiting themselves at the expense of the middle class and working poor… When a society loses its moral foundation, it’s only a matter of time before the economy and currency deteriorate and the wealth gaps between the rich and poor increase dramatically—Jonathan Wellum  

In this issue

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy 

June 2025 Deficit: A Countdown to Fiscal Shock 

When deficits become destiny: the fiscal countdown accelerates—a convergence of easy money and political overreach

I. A Delayed Reckoning: Anatomy of a Fiscal Shock 

A fiscal shock rarely emerges from a single misstep. It crystallizes from compound misalignments across policy, ideology, and behavior. It’s the law of unintended consequences—unfolding in real time. Where economic orthodoxy meets political convenience, stability is hollowed out. And just as critically, it’s a delayed consequence of systemic denial. 

Here are the five pillars of this reckoning: 

1. Easy Money–Financed Free Lunch Politics 

regime of entitlement—fueled by populist spending and post-pandemic ultra-low rates—fostered a seductive illusion: 

Deficits don’t matter. Debt is painless. 

Years of stimulus, subsidies, and politically popular transfers hardened into fiscal habit— habits that now resist restraint, and are rooted in beliefs that are difficult to dismantle. 

2. The Political Cult of Spending-Led Ideology: Trickle-Down by Government Fiat 

At the heart of the Philippine development model lies a flawed political-economic ideology: that elite consumption and state expenditure will "trickle down" to the broader economy. 

Massive infrastructure programs, defense outlays, and subsidy-heavy welfare budgets may deliver short-term optics—but they also crowd out private investment, misallocate capital, and accelerate savings erosion. 

The result: an economy that becomes top-heavy, brittle, and structurally vulnerable. 

This heavy-handed, statist-interventionist, anti-market bias is what Ludwig von Mises called "statolatry"—the worship of the state. 

3. Chronic Policy Diagnostic Blindness 

In the social democratic playbook, populist tools dominate. And with them comes a dangerous neglect of structural realities:

  • Crowding out is ignored
  • Balance sheet mismatches are waved off
  • Price distortions go unexamined
  • Resource misallocations are dismissed
  • Economic trade-offs are neglected 

Intervention becomes the default—not the diagnosis. The result? Mispriced assets, distorted capital structures, and risk narratives untethered from fundamentals. 

The same statolatry—elevating state action above market signals—undergirds this blindness. It promotes interventionist reflexes at the expense of incentive clarity and institutional coherence. 

Fragility escalates—masked by the optics of populist-driven fiscal theatrics. 

4. Econometric Myopia: Forecasting the Past 

The establishment clings to econometric models built on frangible assumptions—historical baselines, linear extrapolation, and trend mimicry. These tools overlook what matters most: 

  • Nonlinear disruption
  • Inflection points
  • Complex feedback loops
  • Tail risks and structural breaks 

With ZERO margin for error, fragility festers beneath the surface

That fragility was laid bare by a maelstrom of paradigm shifts: 

  • The pandemic rupture
  • Deglobalization and trade fragmentation
  • Raging asset bubbles
  • Debt overload
  • Mountains of malinvestments
  • Hot wars and geopolitical shockwaves
  • Inflation surges
  • Financial weaponization 

This isn’t noise—it’s a new architecture of global and domestic uncertainties. And econometric orthodoxy isn’t equipped to model it. 

5. Behavioral Fragility: The Psychology of Denial 

Heuristics shape policy—and not in ways that reward foresight. Beyond populist signaling and econometric hindsight, cognitive distortions rule: 

  • Recency bias
  • Rear-view heuristics
  • Political denialism masked as institutional confidence 

Years of perceived “resilience” dulled vigilance: 

  • Every deficit was shrugged off
  • Every peso slide deemed temporary
  • Every fiscal blowout “absorbed” by the system 

This cultivated an expectation: past stability ensures future resilience. It doesn’t. That assumption—embedded deep within policy reflexes—has left institutions blind to volatility and ill-equipped for disruptions and rupture. 

II. Countdown to Fiscal Shock: The Hidden Story of June’s Blowout


Figure 1

In May, we warned that if June 2025's deficit merely hits its four-year average of Php 200 billion, the six-month budget gap would surge to Php 723.9 billion—surpassing the pandemic-era record of Php 716.07 billion. (Figure 1, upper window) 

Inquirer.net, July 25, 2025: The Marcos administration exceeded its budget deficit limit in the first half of 2025 after narrowly missing both its spending and revenue targets. This happened amid a gradual fiscal consolidation program. Latest data from the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr) showed the government logged a budget gap of P765.5 billion in the first six months, which it needed to plug with borrowings. This was 24.69 percent bigger compared with a year ago. (italics added) 

Then came the payload: Php 241.6 billion in fresh red ink last June!   

The government’s first-half deficit reached Php 765.5 billion—24.69% higher than last year and larger than even our most aggressive baseline x.com forecast (Php 745.18–Php 756.53 billion). (Figure 1, table)


Figure 2 

Bullseye! Our projections weren't just close—they were surgical. And the final blowout went further still. (Figure 2, topmost chart) 

Curiously underreported, June’s deficit marked an all-time high, driven by expenditure growth of 8.5% outstripping revenue growth of 3.5%. (Figure 2, middle graph) 

  • BIR Collections: Up 16.24% YoY—a strong bounce from 10.71% in May and 4.71% in June 2024.
  • BoC Collections: Recovered 3.23% YoY, compared to –6.94% in May and 0.67% in June 2024.
  • Non-Tax Revenues: Plunged 43.25% YoY—from 40.93% in May and 81.7% in June 2024. 

Behind the aggregate improvement lies deeper fragility: June’s revenue outperformance was narrow, uneven, and ultimately insufficient to contain the programmed spending expansion—a predictable artifact of the conventional socio-democratic ochlocratic political model

Populist instincts override structural diagnostics. And the fiscal narrative remains hostage to crowd-pleasing interventionism rather than incentive discipline or institutional coherence.

III. Q2 Slowdown, Q1 Surge: Anatomy of the Half-Year Blowout—From Past Binge to Present Reckoning 

Despite June's record deficit, Q2 posted just Php 319.5 billion, the second slowest since 2020. That means the bulk of the six-month deficit—Php 446.03 billion—was frontloaded in Q1. 

Even then, authorities revised March spending down by Php 32.784 billion, artificially narrowing the Q1 deficit. Adjustments may mask the underlying magnitude but not the fiscal trajectory. 

This six-month outcome validates what we’ve long emphasized: programmed spending vs. variable revenues is no longer an assumption—it’s a structural vulnerability, a primary source of instability 

Importantly, this wasn’t an emergency stimulus. Unlike 2021, there’s been no recession nor one in the immediate horizon—per consensus. 

Yet the deficit beat that year’s record—despite BSP’s historic easing:

  • Policy rate cuts
  • Reserve requirement reduction
  • USDPHP cap
  • Liquidity injections
  • Deposit insurance expansion 

Behind the optics: a quiet financial bailout, not of households or industries, but of the banking system. 

IV. Technocratic Overreach, Authorized Expenditures, Congressional Irrelevance 

As we earlier noted: the government continues to use linear extrapolation in a complex environment. Even with declared economic slowdown, the BIR posted 14.11% growth, buoyed by May–June outperformance. (Figure 2, lowest image) 

But has "benchmark-ism" inflated performance claims? Have authorities padded the numerator (tax data) to rationalize a fragile denominator (spending data)?


Figure 3

Non-tax revenue was the Achilles’ heel—its 2024 spike became the baseline for 2025’s enacted spending binge. The result: forecast miscalibration leading directly to fiscal shock. Beyond mere overconfidence, it was technocratic hubris that helped trigger today’s blowout. (Figure 3, topmost visual) 

Again, an underperforming economy—whether a below-target GDP, sharp slowdown, or even recession—would only reinforce this SPEND-and-RESCUE dynamic, repackaged and sold as stimulus. 

Meanwhile, authorized expenditures: Php 3.026 trillion. Remaining balance: Php 3.3 trillion, implying a floor monthly average of Php 550.05 billion

Budgets have been breached 6 years in a row—highlighting a redistribution of budgetary power from Congress to the Executive. 

Whether through creative reinterpretation or technical loopholes, these breaches signal a quiet transfer of fiscal power from Congress to the Executive. 

V. Deficit Forecasting: Averaging Toward a Crisis 

Looking at pandemic-era averages:

  • Q3 deficits averaged Php 374 billion
    • Q3 2024 hit Php 356.32 billion (–5.7% below average)
  • Q4 averaged Php 537.9 billion Q4 is typically the largest—as government drops all remaining balance and more
    • Q4 2024 deficit: Php 536.13 billion (–0.4% deviation)
  • 2H Average: Php 911.6 billion
    • 2H 2024: Php 892.45 billion (–2.6% vs trend) 

If 2025 follows this pattern, the full-year deficit could hit Php 1.677 trillion—Php 7 billion above prior records. 

But averages conceal real-world volatility, political discretion, and data manipulation—can skew results. 

Once again, it bears emphasizing: all this unfolded as the BSP eased aggressively—through rate and RRR cuts, doubled deposit insurance, capped USDPHP volatility, and expanded credit (mostly consumer-focused). 

Despite the stimulus, vulnerabilities not only persist—they’re escalating. 

If so, the DBCC's revised deficit-to-GDP target of 5.5% would be breached, necessitating another substantial upward adjustment. (Figure 3, middle table) 

Authorities would be mistaken to treat this as mere statistical noise; its implications extend far beyond the ledger into the real economy

VI. Financing Strain and the Debt-Debt Servicing Spiral 

Treasury financing soared 86.2%, from Php 665 billion to Php 1.238 trillion in H1 2025. (Figure 3, lowest diagram) 

Even with record high cumulative cash reserves of Php 1.09 trillion, June alone posted a residual cash deficit of Php 90.09 billion—evidence that surplus buffers are already depleted.


Figure 4 

As such, in June, public debt spiked Php 1.783 trillion YoY (+11.52%) or Php 348 billion (+2.06%) MoM to reach a historic Php 17.27 trillion! (Figure 4, topmost pane) 

Critically, this growth has outpaced the spending curve, suggesting potential deficit understatement or an acceleration of off-book liabilities. (Figure 4, middle image) 

Despite this, external debt share rebounded in June—a pivot back to foreign financing amid domestic constraints. (Figure 4, lowest graph)


Figure 5

Meanwhile, total debt servicing fell 40.12% YoY due to a 61% plunge in amortizations, even though interest payments hit a record. (Figure 5, topmost diagram) 

Why?

Likely causes:

  • Scheduling choices
  • Prepayments in 2024
  • Political aversion to public backlash 

But the record and growing deficit ensures that borrowing—and debt servicing—will keep RISING. This won’t be deferred—it will amplify. 

As we warned last May

  • More debt  more servicing  less for everything else.
  • Crowding out hits both public and private spending.
  • Revenue gains won’t keep up with servicing.
  • Inflation and peso depreciation risks climb.
  • Higher taxes are on the horizon 

VII. Tax Dragnet, CMEPA’s Forced Financial Rotation: The Economic Asphyxiation Tightens 

Debt-to-GDP hit 62%, triggering a quiet revision: Malacañang raised the ceiling to 70%. 

To accommodate this, authorities imposed a hefty tax on interest income via the Capital Markets Efficiency Promotion Act (CMEPA), engineering a forced rotation out of long-dated fixed income into leverage-fueled speculation and spending— (see previous discussions) 

This fiscal extraction dragnet is poised to widen—ensnaring more of the economy and constricting what little fiscal breathing room remains. 

VIII. Bank’s Fiscal Complicity, Liquidity Strains, Treasury Market’s Mutiny 

Banks continue to stockpile government securities through net claims on the central government (NCoCG). (Figure 5, middle image) 

Yet despite BSP’s easing, treasury yields barely moved—fueling further Held-to-Maturity (HTM) hoarding and deepening the industry's liquidity drain. 

At end of July, despite dovish guidance: (Figure 5, lowest graph) 

  • Yields across the curve stayed above ONRRPmuting or blunting transmission
  • Curve flattened unevenly: front and long ends softened, belly firmed—signaling hedging against medium-term risk
  • T-bill rates remained elevated signaling inflation fears and short-term funding stress 

Despite rate cuts, the treasury market refused to follow. Monetary policy faces bond mutineers. 

IX. Mounting USDPHP Exchange Rate Tension


Figure 6 

Following the June fiscal report, the USDPHP surged 1.29% on July 31, wiping out prior losses to post a modest 0.52% year-to-date return. 

With wider deficits on deck, foreign borrowing becomes more attractive—and a weaker dollar, further incentivized by the BSP’s soft peg, adds fuel to that pivot. But beneath the surface, this dynamic strain long-term currency stability. 

While global dollar softness might offset domestic fragilities, the USDPHP’s recent breakout hints at further testing—possibly probing the BSP’s 59-Maginot line, a psychological and tactical policy threshold. (Figure 6 upper chart) 

Should that line give, external financing costs and FX volatility could surge, exposing cracks in the peg architecture. (Figure 6, lower graph) 

X. Conclusion: The Structural Fragility of Deficit Philosophy

The Php 17.27 trillion debt—and growing—isn’t the cost of failure. It’s the price of consensus under a soft-focus ochlocratic social democracy

These systems don’t just elect leaders—they ratify an ethos: that deficit-fueled expansion is not only moral but inevitable. Redistribution becomes ritual. The annual SONA pipelines new spending schemes, boosting short-term political capital—but the structural anchors are threadbare. 

Compassion without discipline sedates policyVoters misread rhetoric as reform, empathy as capability, largesse as virtue, and control as stewardship. Time preferences spiral, gravitating toward the instant dopamine hit of political dispensation. 

Alas—the tragedy is not merely fiscal. It’s intergenerational erosionEach electoral cycle mortgages future agency, compounding fragility over time. 

What’s swelling isn’t just debt. It’s a philosophical incoherence—subsidizing dysfunction and labeling it 'development.’ 

When such convictions are deeply embedded, a disorderly reckoning is inevitable. 

____

References 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Philippines’ May and 5-Month 2025 Budget Deficit: Can Political Signaling Mask a Looming Fiscal Shock? Substack July 7, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Is the Philippines on the Brink of a 2025 Fiscal Shock? Substack June 8, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, Philippine Fiscal Performance in Q1 2025: Record Deficit Amid Centralizing Power, Substack May 4, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The Seen, the Unseen, and the Taxed: CMEPA as Financial Repression by Design, Substack, July 20, 2025 

Prudent Investor Newsletter, The CMEPA Delusion: How Fallacious Arguments Conceal the Risk of Systemic Blowback, Substack, July 27, 2025 

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